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Defendant/Respondent Albert Kienke, submits the 
following brief in opposition to the petition for writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions are presented to this Court for 
review: 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it upheld 
the ruling of the trial court that the decedent was responsible 
for the dangerous condition he created. 
2. Whether the ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals 
conflicts with the decisions of this Court in holding that 
because the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law, the 
Court need not rule on the issue of statutory employment. 
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
On May 10, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a 
unanimous decision, issued its opinion affirming the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of Albert Kienke. Plaintiff filed a 
Petition for Rehearing. On June 2, 1989, the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued an order denying the Petition for Rehearing. 
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GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The petitioner has asserted that this Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This Court's interpretation of the following statute 
is pertinent to the determination of the issues presented for 
review. Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-57 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of the decision by the Utah Court of 
Appeals which affirmed a summary judgment by the trial court 
dismissing the plaintiff's wrongful death action. Plaintiff's 
decedent, Robert English, was rebuilding the front porch of the 
house he was renting from the defendant. He had removed the 
columns which held up the roof of the porch and had put temporary 
supports in their place. When the supports gave way the roof 
fell on him and he sustained injuries which resulted in his 
death. 
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The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the landowner, 
Albert Kienke, was negligent. Plaintiff's complaint also 
alleged that Mr. Kienke was Mr. English's employer under the 
Workers1 Compensation Act and sought punitive damages for 
Mr. Kienkefs alleged "knowing and reckless disregard for the 
safety of plaintiff's deceased." 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Following substantial discovery efforts by both parties 
including structural design studies by the parties1 experts, 
defendant brought his Motion for Summary Judgment, and in 
response, plaintiff filed his Counter-motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. On August 31, 1987, the Honorable David S. Young 
entered the Court's Memorandum Decision in favor of the 
defendant; and on September 4, 1987, the Court entered its Order 
awarding defendant Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the District Court. 
On May 10, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Motion 
for Summary Judgment in favor of Mr. Kienke. Plaintiff filed a 
Petition for Rehearing which was denied by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in an Order issued June 2, 1989. 
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3. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The petitioner's "Statement of Relevant Facts" is 
argumentive, conclusory, misleading and without support in the 
record. The petitioner has mischaracterized the facts as set 
forth in his trial court brief and his brief to the Court of 
Appeals. Paragraphs 1 and 3 refer to documents that are not in 
the record. Paragraph 9 refers to a nonexistent page 131 in 
Albert Kienke!s deposition. Paragraph 11 cites merely to 
appellant's prior Summary Judgment Brief and not to any evidence 
in the records. 
The uncontroverted facts are as follows: 
1. Albert Kienke has worked for the Utah Department of 
Transportation for the last 25 years as a land acquisition agent. 
He has a part-time business as a small landowner. (Deposition of 
Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 4-6, 14-16). 
2. Defendant, Albert Kienke, and his wife were the 
joint owners of a house located at 1031 Windsor Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (Id. at p. 3). 
3. In December, 1984, the house was in need of 
extensive repairs. There was a hole in the ceiling, holes in the 
doors, kitchen cabinet doors needed to be rehung, the carpet 
needed to be replaced and the front porch needed work. (Id. at 
pp. 38-42). 
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4. The ceiling inside the front porch was in poor 
shape and one beam on the north side of the front porch was 
sagging considerably. The roof of the porch was supported by big 
columns which needed paint but other than that, there was nothing 
wrong with them. (Id. at p. 42). 
5. Robert English was born on March 18, 1957. He was 
28 years of age at the time of his death. (Deposition of Daniel 
English, Record at 267, p. 4). 
6. Robert English was a graduate student at the 
University of Utah at the time of his death. (Record at 146, 
148). 
7. In January of 1985 Robert English telephoned 
Mr. Kienke to ask him if he had a place to rent. Mr. Kienke 
responded that the only place that was vacant was the house at 
1031 Windsor which needed "an awful lot of repairs." Mr. English 
said that he was interested in doing the repairs. (Deposition of 
Albert Kienke, Record at 269, pp. 44-46). 
8. Mr. Kienke met Mr. English at the Windsor Street 
house in January, 1985. Mr. English said he needed a place to 
rent but he didn't have a lot of money. Mr. Kienke said the 
place needed a lot of work. Mr. English asked if he could do the 
work in exchange for the rent. Mr. Kienke agreed. (Iji. at pp. 
46-47). 
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9. Mr. Kienke showed Mr. English the property and 
pointed out what repairs were needed, including a new plywood 
floor, new linoleum in the kitchen, new kitchen cabinets, a new 
floor and linoleum in the bathroom, paint in the kitchen, paint 
on the outside and repair work on the ceiling of the front porch. 
(Id. at pp. 48-52). 
10. The front porch seemed solid but Mr. English 
suggested that he could repair the bottoms of the posts on the 
two outside corners of the porch and that he could repair a 
couple of loose boards on the steps. (Id. at pp. 52-54). 
11. Mr. English drew up all of the plans for repairs 
and submitted them to Mr. Kienke for approval. (Id. at pp. 55-
57). 
12. Mr. Kienke paid for the materials used by either 
giving Mr. English checks in advance, or by reimbursing 
Mr. English later. (Id. at p. 57). Mr. Kienke occasionally 
supplied materials himself. (Id. at pp. 60-62). 
13. Mr. English planned the work himself, and did the 
work on his own. Mr. Kienke testified: 
Well, he wanted to do it all and plan it. So 
I just left him alone and let him do it 
because he was doing it. He was in charge of 
it, and he was doing it. 
(Id. at p. 56). 
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14. Mr. English did all of the work himself except 
that Mr. Kienke made a jam for the back door which Mr. English 
installed. (Id. at p. 58). 
15. During the time that Mr. English was working on 
the house, Mr. Kienke would not see Mr. English for a month or 
two at a time. (Id. at p. 62). 
16. The only instructions Mr. Kienke gave to 
Mr. English regarding the repairs were that he wanted good 
quality work done, but not to go overboard on the expense, 
because it was a rental unit. (Id. at pp. 55-60). 
17. Mr. English provided most of his own hand tools 
but borrowed a power Skil saw, a shovel, a tub to mix cement and 
a roof jack from Mr. Kienke. (Id. at pp. 66, 67). 
18. Before Mr. English began to work on the porch he 
told Mr. Kienke that he was going to replace the two posts on 
each end of the porch and pour cement footings for the posts. 
Mr. Kienke told Mr. English not to do any more than he had to, 
but mainly repair the porch ceiling, repair the sagging beam on 
the north said of the porch and install some planks on the floor. 
(Id. at pp. 68-70). 
19. In December, 1985, Mr. English telephoned 
Mr. Kienke and said he wanted Mr. Kienke to see what he had done 
on the porch. Mr. Kienke went to the house and was shocked to 
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find that the whole lower part of the porch, the decking, the 
steps and the sub-beams had been removed. All that remained was 
the roof of the porch and the three columns which Mr. English had 
supported with cement blocks. (Id. at pp. 71-23). 
20. Mr. Kienke told Mr. English to be certain to have 
plenty of two-by-fours at the sides of the porch to support the 
ceiling. Mr. English told Mr. Kienke how he was going to build 
the porch and his plans appeared adequate to Mr. Kienke. (Id. at 
p. 74). 
21. On January 4, 1986, the roof of the porch fell 
from its temporary supports onto Mr. English, causing his death. 
(Complaint, Record at p. 3, paragraph 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of 
the trial court based on sound judicial precedent and in doing 
so, did not depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings. Albert Kienke was under no duty to warn his tenant, 
Robert English, of risks that were known to Mr. English or were 
so obvious and apparent that Mr. English could reasonably be 
expected to discover them. The alleged dangerous condition, 
i.e., the inadequate support for the porch roof was not only 
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obvious and apparent to Mr. English, it was created by 
Mr. English. 
2. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals does not 
conflict with the decisions of this Court in upholding the 
Summary Judgment. The decision of the Court of Appeals was 
consistent with both prior decisions of this Court and 
statutory law. Both the case law and the Workers' Compensation 
Act agree that because as a matter of law Mr. Kienke was not 
negligent, the Court need not rule on whether Mr. Kienke was 
Mr. English's employer. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court states 
that: 
[r]eview by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only when there are 
special and important reasons. Therefore, 
the following, while neither controlling nor 
wholely measuring the Court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered: 
. . . 
(2) when a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of state or 
federal law in a way that is in conflict with 
the decision of this Court; 
(3) when a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanction such a departure by a lower court as 
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to call for an exercise of this Court's power 
of supervision. 
Neither of the two grounds for review alleged by 
petitioner applies to this cas<w • There is ample precedence for 
the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In addition, bare 
contentions unsupported in the record raise no material issue of 
fact so as to preclude the entry of Summary Judgment. Massey v. 
Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). Petitioner cannot 
charge the Court of Appeals with departure from judicial practice 
simply because it did not accept petitioner's unsupported version 
of the facts. Robert English created the risk himself when he 
removed the support posts and replaced them with a stack of 
cement blocks. Albert Kienke was thus under no duty to warn 
Robert English of dangers which were known to him or which were 
so obvious and apparent that he may reasonably have been expected 
to discover them. 
POiNT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE RULING OF 
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ON SOUND JUDICIAL 
PRECEDENT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DECEDENT WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DANGEROUS CONDITION HE 
CREATED. 
The uncontroverted deposition testimony of Albert 
Kienke establishes that the condition of the porch which resulted 
in its collapse in the death of Robert English was not created by 
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any actions or inaction on the part of Albert Kienke but was 
created solely by the actions of the decedent, Robert English. 
Prior to Mr. English's work on the porch, the ceiling and one 
beam on the north side of the porch were in disrepair but the 
columns which supported the porch were strong and stable. 
Mr. English took it upon himself to remove those columns and to 
place the roof supports on temporary blocks to hold up the porch 
roof. It was while the porch was in this condition that the 
supports gave way and the roof fell on Mr. English resulting in 
his death. 
The plaintiff contends that Mr. Kienke negligently 
allowed the porch to exist in dangerous condition, thereby, 
resulting in the death of Robert English. The law in Utah is 
clear that a landowner owes no duty to warn an invitee of a 
danger which is known to the invitee or which is obvious. In 
Moore v. Burton Lumber and Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 
1981), this Court stated the rule as follows: 
It has long been held that a property owner 
has no obligation to warn an invitee of 
dangers which are known to the invitee or 
which are so obvious and apparent that he may 
be reasonably be expected to discover them. 
In Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978). The 
defendant's horse became entangled in a chain because of the 
defendant's alleged negligence in the manner of which the horse 
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was tied to the post. At the defendant's request the plaintiff 
attempted to disentangle the horse and in doing so the plaintiff 
was trampled by the horse. The plaintiff brought suit against 
the defendant in the manner in which the horse was tied. The 
Court upheld a summary judgment in favor of the defendant saying: 
Where there is a dangerous condition on one's 
property, which is just as observable to an 
invitee as to the owner, the owner has no 
duty to warn or the protect the invitee 
except to observe the universal standard of 
reasonable care under the circumstances. Let 
it be assumed that the manner in which the 
horse was tied was negligent and that this 
created a dangerous condition. When 
plaintiff came there, whatever negligence 
existed in that regard had come to rest. 
There is nothing whatsoever to indicate that 
the defendant failed in any duty to exercise 
care for the plaintiff's safety after the 
latter entered the premises. He had the 
freedom of choice and opportunity to avoid 
any injury to himself. 
In the present case the dangerous condition, i.e., the 
manner in which the porch roof was supported, not only was it 
apparent to the plaintiff's decedent as to tne defendant, but the 
condition was created by the plaintiff's decedent. Under Utah 
law a tenant is liable for a dangerous condition created by him. 
In Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court ^uled that: 
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"It is the tenant who is liable for any 
dangerous condition on the premises which he 
creates or permits to come into existence 
after he has taken possession." 
Stephenson, at 568 quoting Restatement of Torts Section 355. 
Mr. English retained the freedom and opportunity to 
avoid injury and Mr. Kienke as landowner certainly cannot be held 
liable for conditions which he not only did not create but which 
were created by the injured party. 
In order to support the claim that the ruling by the 
trial court was improper, petitioner has mischaracterized facts 
contrary to what is actually on the record. For example, 
petitioner describes Mr. Kienke as being "actively involved" in 
Mr. English's repairs even though it is clear from the record he 
was rarely involved in the project at all. Petitioner also 
continues to refer to the decedent as to Mr. Kienke's "employee" 
despite the lack of support in the record and the ruling by the 
trial court that Mr. English was an independent contractor. 
In addition to misrepresenting the facts, petitioner 
has either mischaracterized or simply misunderstood the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals 
found that the decedent was liable for the risks he created 
merely because he did the "hand-ons" work in the project. A 
careful reading of the Court's opinion, however, reveals that the 
Court of Appeals based its decision on Stephenson v. Warner, 
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supra, in which this Court held that the tenant who creates a 
dangerous condition is responsible for his injury. Such a ruling 
accurately reflects the facts and circumstances of this case. 
Despite the efforts of petitioner to raise issues of 
material fact or problems with the ruling of the Court of Appeals 
there is simply nothing which could be characterized as a 
departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings, and thus 
nothing in the opinion of the Court of Appeals which would merit 
review by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ITS 
FOUNDATION IN BOTH THE UTAH WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT AND IN UTAH CASE LAW, AND 
DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THIS 
COURT. 
The trial court found that Robert English was an 
independent contractor and was not an employee of Mr. Kienke. 
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Mr. Kienke was 
Mr. English's employer, Mr. Kienke would still not be liable for 
Mr. English's injuries. 
Section 35-1-57 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
states: 
[e]mployers who shall fail to comply with the 
provisions of Section 35-1-46 shall not be 
entitled to the benefits of this title during 
the period of noncompliance, but shall be 
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liable in a civil action to their employees 
for damages suffered by reason of personal 
injuries arising out of or in the course of 
employment caused by the wrongful act, 
neglect or default of the employer or any of 
the employer's officers, agents or employees 
and also to the defendant's personal 
representatives if such employees where death 
results from such injuries . . . Proof of the 
injury shall constitute prima facie evidence 
of negligence on the part of the employer and 
the burden shall be upon the employer to show 
freedom from negligence resulting in such 
injuries. 
Because Mr. Kienke has met this burden and proven that 
as a matter of law he was free from negligence, the issue of 
whether he was Mr. English's employer has become moot under the 
statute. This view is supported by Peterson v. Sorensen, 65 P.2d 
12 (Utah 1937), which was cited by the Court of Appeals. In 
Peterson this Court said that: 
"[t]here is nothing in the Workmen's 
Compensation Act which justifies plaintiff in 
recovery in either for negligence not 
charged, or for negligence charged but not 
proven." 
The issue of whether Mr. Kienke was the employer of 
Mr. English is now irrelevant because Mr. Kienke was not 
negligent as a matter of law. This ruling by the Court of 
Appeals has the support of both the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Statute and a prior decision of this Court. Because the ruling 
in no way conflicts with a prior decision by this Court, it thus 
cannot serve as a basis for review by certiorari. 
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CONCLUSION 
The alleged dangerous condition which resulted in 
Mr. E glish's death, the inadequate support for the porch roof, 
was not only open and obvious to Mr. English, it was created by 
him. Albert Kienke was thus under no duty to warn Mr. English of 
an obvious risk. There is ample precedent in Utah law to support 
*~he ruling by the Court of Appeals affirming the summary 
judgment of the trial court, and thus the decision in no way 
departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings so as to 
justify review of certiorari by this Court. The decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals does not conflict with a decision of this 
Court in finding that because Mr. Kienke was not negligent as a 
matter of law, it need not reach the issue of whether he was the 
employer of Mr. English. The decision of the Court of Appeals 
was totally consistent with prior decisions of this Court and 
with statutory law and thus does not merit review of certiorari 
by this Court. 
DATED this J ^ day of s^^^r , 1989. 
AARON ALMA NELSON/Esq. r 
of and for 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Counsel for Defendant/Respondent 
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APPENDIX A 
LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
Section 35-1-42 
35-1-42. Employer* enumerated and defined—Regularly employed—In-
dependent contractors.—The following shall constitute employers subject 
to the provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district therein. 
(2) lavery person, firm and private corporation, including every pub-
lic utility, having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly 
employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except 
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers 
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come 
under the terms of "ciis tiua by complying with the provisions thereof and 
the rules and regulations of the commission. 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employments in 
the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the em-
ployer, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of 
the year* 
"Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part 
for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or con-
trol, and such work Is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such subcon-
tractors, shall he deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees 
of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in 
xhe performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed 
an employer within the meaning of this section- The term "independent 
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or 
corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another, who, 
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to 
the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of the em-
ployer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of 
work^ and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
APPENDIX B 
E TITLE: 
iel English, as Personal 
resentative of the Estate 
Robert English, 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
No. 880236-CA 
tert Kienke, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
[TIES: 
td R. Si lvester 
irles P. Sampson 
mdia Berry (Argued) 
[TTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
:orneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
) Clark Learning Office Center 
5 South West Temple 
It Lake City, UT 84101-1480 
con Alma Nelson (Argued) 
HSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
-counsel for Defendant and Respondent 
00 Continental Bank Building 
It Lake City, UT 84101 
Ian L. Larson 
OW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
-counsel for Defendant and Respondent 
Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
O. Box 45000 
It Lake City, UT 84145 
IAL JUDGE: 
norable David S. Young 
It Lake County 
ird District Court 
0 East 400 South 
It Lake City, Ut 84111 
y 10, 1989. OPINION 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the District 
Court herein be, and the same is, affirmed. 
Opinion of the Court by RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge; REGNAL W. 
GARFF and GREGORY K. ORME, Judges, concur. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 10TH day of May, 1989, a true and 
:orrect copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally 
lelivered to each of the above parties. 
rRIAL COURT: 
Salt Lake County 
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Daniel English, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Robert English, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Albert Kienke, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Fred R. Silvester, Charles P. Sampson, and Claudia 
Berry, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Aaron Alma Nelson and Allan L. Larson, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals entry of summary judgment for defendant in 
a wrongful death action. We affirm, finding no error in the 
trial courtfs determination that plaintiff's decedent was liable 
as a matter of law for the dangerous condition which he created 
and which resulted in his death. 
On January 4, 1986, 28-year-old graduate student Robert 
English was killed in a tragic accident while rebuilding the 
front porch of his leased house at 1031 Windsor Street, Salt 
Lake City. Temporary supports placed under the roof of the 
porch by the decedent gave way, causing the roof to fall onto 
him. 
Plaintiff Daniel English, personal representative of 
decedent's estate, filed a negligence action against the 
property owner, defendant Albert Kienke. The record shows that 
defendant, by oral agreement, permitted the decedent to live in 
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the house rent-free in exchange for decedent's labor in making 
repairs to the house. Although defendant had told decedent the 
front porch needed repair, decedent planned and executed the 
work himself, and defendant supplied or paid for the materials. 
Plaintiff filed two motions for partial summary judgment on 
the issue of whether an employee-employer relationship existed 
between the parties, and defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment. In a memorandum decision, the district court found 
that the decedent had created the dangerous condition which 
killed him, and that he was an "independent contractor" under 
workers' compensation law. The trial court entered summary 
judgment for defendant and denied plaintiff's motions. 
Plaintiff claims on appeal that entry of summary judgment 
for defendant is in error, contending that there are unresolved 
factual issues involving the reasonableness of the risk of harm 
and whether the dangerous condition of the porch was within 
defendant's knowledge. Plaintiff notes that "[w]hether an 
unreasonable risk of harm exist[s] is a determination of fact to 
be made by the jury." Wagoner v. Waterslide Inc.. 744 P.2d 
1012, 1013 (Utah App. 1987). 
Summary judgment may be granted whenever the trial court 
determines that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our analytical standard 
for review of a summary judgment is the same as that of the 
trial court: we review the facts and inferences from those 
facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. SsJLtal 
v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989). If we 
conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the 
summary judgment will be overturned and the case remanded for 
further proceedings on that issue. I&. Where no material facts 
remain unresolved, we examine the trial court's conclusions of 
law and review them for correctness. Bonham v. Morgan. 102 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (1989) (per curiam). 
We note that summary judgment should be granted with great 
caution where negligence is alleged. Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. 
Cheney. 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). This is because 
"(ilssues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to 
be resolved by the fact finder." Id. "It is only when the 
facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be 
drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of law." Id.. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for only the most 
clear-cut negligence cases. Ingram v. Salt Lake Citv. 733 P.2d 
126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). Ssa, e^g., Webster v. Sill. 
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) (summary judgment affirmed for 
landlord where tenant was injured while mowing lawn in exchange 
for rent reduction). 
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant, 
relying on the holding of Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
R-R. Co.- 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964). Steals, however, 
was decided on the basis of the duty owed by a landowner to an 
"invitee." This is consistent with the common law notion that 
the duty of care owed to a person injured on another's property 
depended on whether the injured party was classified as an 
invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gregory v. Fourthwest inv.. 
Ltd-., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988). 
Utah has now abandoned these artificial common law 
categories, and expanded the landlord's common law duty. Id. 
It is, therefore, unnecessary to wrestle with the issue of 
whether at the time of the accident decedent could best be 
described as a "licensee" or "invitee." Rather, we now impose 
upon landowners "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their 
tenants in all circumstances." Id. (quoting Williams v. Melbv. 
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985)). That duty of reasonable care 
encompasses care to assure their property is "reasonably safe 
and suitable for intended uses." Stephenson v. Warner. 581 P.2d 
567, 568 (Utah 1978). Landowners may be liable for injuries 
caused by dangerous conditions which they create, and which they 
should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable 
risk of harm. Id* Landowners are not liable, however, if 
tenants fail to keep the premises "reasonably safe and in good 
repair." Id. Moreover, tenants are liable for any dangerous 
condition on the premises which they create or permit to come 
into existence after they have taken possession. Id* at 568-69; 
see generally. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 355 (1965). 
In granting summary judgment to defendant, the trial court 
apparently considered the pleadings, answers to defendant's 
interrogatories, and the depositions of the parties.1 The 
trial court then determined that "the decedent created the risk 
by removing the foundational support for the porch," a 
conclusion clearly supported by the record. It is clear that 
decedent did all of the porch reconstruction himself, and was so 
engaged when the accident occurred. It is also clear that 
decedent placed temporary supports under the roof and did so 
without the assistance of the defendant. None of these material 
facts were disputed. Accordingly, only one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn—decedent created the dangerous 
1. We can only presume that the trial court did not consider 
other depositions in the record since the court never referred 
to them and they were filed after the date of summary judgment. 
Depositions not considered below may not be considered on 
appeal. SSfi Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins. 
Underwriters. Inc.. 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963); 
Rosander v. Larsen. 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146 (1962). 
condition that caused his own death. 
We find no error in the trial court's ruling that it was the 
decedent, not the defendant, who was negligent as a matter of 
law. steohenson established that the tenant who creates a 
dangerous condition is responsible for his own injury. I£. at 
568-69. Although the trial court did not cite sfceohenson as the 
legal basis for its decision, we may affirm the trial court on 
any proper legal basis. Berabe v. Fashion Centre. Ltd., 104 
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (1989); Tavlor v. ffsfrafce of Tavlor. 770 P.2d 
163, 169 (Utah App. 1989). 
Plaintiff further characterizes the relationship between 
defendant and the decedent as one of employer-employee, and 
claims that the trial court erred in finding otherwise. 
Plaintiff seeks resolution of this issue in his favor in order 
to impose a statutory duty upon defendant to provide a safe 
workplace. fifls Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-12 (1988). If defendant 
was deemed to be an employer and failed to secure workers' 
compensation protection for the decedent, plaintiff could also 
seek certain statutory penalties against defendant. Saa Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-57 (permitting civil actions by injured 
employees against such employers where injury is "caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer"). Since it is 
conclusive as a matter of law, however, that decedent, not 
defendant, was the negligent party, we need not reach the issue 
of statutory employment. S&& Peterson v. Sorensen. 91 Utah 507, 
65 P.2d 12, 16 (1937) (noncompliance with workers' compensation 
act does not justify recovery for negligence charged but not 
proven). 
Summary judgment for defendant is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Daniel English, as Pe sonal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Robert English, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Albert KienJce, 
Defendant and Respondent 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 880236-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter, 
and the Court having duly considered said petition. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff/Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this 02nd day of June, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT 
Mary T/Noonan 
Clerjybf the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 05, June 1989 I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
by depositing the same with the United States Mail, postage prepaid 
to the following: 
Fred R. Silvester 
Charles P. Sampson 
Claudia Berry 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480 
Aaron Alma Nelson 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Co-counsel for Defendant and Respondent 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Allan L. Larson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Co-counsel for Defendant and Respondent 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
DATED this 05th day of June, 1989. 
KathleenTlynn en 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL ENGLISH, as Executor : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of the Estate of ROBERT ENGLISH, 
: CIVIL NO. C-86-1792 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT KIENKE, 
Defendant* 
The above-entitled matter came on for consideratior by the 
Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
heard the argument of the respective attorneys, and based upon 
the arguments and the filed Memoranda, both in support, and in 
opposition, the Court makes this its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court finds that the provisions of Section 342 of the 
Restatement of Torts, as discussed further in the case of steel 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co.. 396 P.2d 751, 16 Utah 
2d 127 (1964), require the Court to conclude that the Motion for 
Summary Judgment on behalf of the defendant should be granted. 
The Court finds that in the critical language related to the 
requirements of a landowner to a licensee there must be met, 
prior to liability, the following conditions: 
ENGLISH V. KIENKE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(a) The possessor knows or has reason to know of 
the condition and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, and 
(b) He fails to exercise reasonable care to make 
the condition safe, and/or to warn the licensee of the 
condition and the risk involved, and 
(c) The licensees do not know or have reason to 
know of the condition and the risk involved. 
The Court finds under the circumstances of this case that 
reasonable minds could not differ in the obligation expected of 
the defendant to recognize the risk. First, the Court finds that 
the decedent created the risk by removing the foundational 
support for the porch, and second, that he did so without the 
approval of the defendant. Certainly the decedent would be 
charged with perceiving the risk at a level at least equal to or 
greater than that required of the defendant. When the defendant 
came by the residential property and observed the changes created 
by the decedent, the defendant had no greater responsibility to 
perceive the risk than that of the decedent. 
The Court cannot find that the defendant should have 
realized that the circumstances involved a "unreasonable risk of 
harm" to the licensee, and that the defendant " . . . should 
expect that they [the decedent] will not discover or realize the 
danger." The Court cannot find that the defendant had a greater 
responsibility to inform the decedent of the risk than the 
decedent should have perceived on his own. 
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Further, the Court cannot find that the defendant failed to 
exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, nor that the 
decedent could not know, or have reason to know of the condition 
and the relative risk. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. The 
Court further finds that the decedent was an independent 
contractor, and not an employee under the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act, and finally, based upon the foregoing, the 
Court cannot find any basis upon which punitive damages could be 
awarded. Thus, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted in each particular. 
Dated this 3 / dav of August, 1987. 
DAVID S./YOUNG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this / day ofJkudfuiJt, 1987: 
Fred R. Silvester 
Michael W. Homer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Aaron Alma Nelson 
Attorney for Defendant 
1300 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Philip R. Fishier 
Co-counsel for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
AARON ALMA NELSON, USB #2379 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL ENGLISH, as Executor 
of the Estate of ROBERT 
ENGLISH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERT KIENKE, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-1792 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment duly came before this Court for hearing on 
August 17, 1987, at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff appeared through his 
attorney, Fred R. Silvester, and Defendant appeared through his 
attorney, Aaron Alma Nelson. Prior to the hearing both parties 
submitted to the Court Memoranda which were reviewed by the Court. 
The Court heard arguments by the parties and took the matter under 
advisement. The Court later issued its Memorandum Decision grant-
ing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court being fully 
advised it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby awarded 
Summary Judgment against Plaintiff. 
DATED t h i s M day of S e p - f e m b & T , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
M 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this ^TJ day of September, 
1987, to: 
Mr. Fred R. Silvester 
Mr. Michael W. Homer 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Mr. Philip R. Fishier 
STRONG & HANNI 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari was mailed, 
postage prepaid thereon, this J^ day of /%>>*?. , 
1989, to: 
FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. 
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
ALLAN L. LARSON, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
